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ABSTRACT 
Background: The intention of this study was to see if there have been any changes in the 
labour supply of hospital physicians after the implementation of the hospital reform in 2002. 
Several studies have shown that physicians spend less time on patient related work and that 
the productivity has decreased.  
Methods: The data material in this thesis is based on second handed data. Two surveys were 
conducted in 2001 and 2006 on randomly collected hospital physicians by the Physician 
register. The total respondents were 1131 physicians in 2001 and 1298 physicians in 2006. 
Results: Hospital physicians have decreased their total working time with approximately 1 
hour in 2006. This may be due to a shifting trend in the society where people are valuing 
more leisure, and less working time. While decreasing the total working time, the hospital 
physicians have increased their amount of patient related work by approximately 3 % (1 
hour) in 2006.  
Conclusion: There have been modest changes in working time, with approximately 1 hour 
decrease in total working hours in 2006, and 1 approximately 1 hour more on patient related 
work in the same year. It can not be concluded that the hospital reform have had any effect 
on working hours and time allocation, but there are indications in the study that trends and 
tendencies towards more family life and leisure are influencing the labour supply among 
physicians. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Intro 
The demand for health care in Norway is increasing and will continue to increase in the 
years to come due to an aging and more demanding population. In the health care sector like 
in any other sector in a society, the resources are scarce. The challenge for the health care 
sector is to produce the best health outcomes with the most efficient use of resources. As a 
consequence of the change in demand for health care in the population, several reforms have 
been implemented to increase efficiency and activity of health care services during the 
recent years. The reforms that have been implemented over the years have influenced both 
the demand and supply of health personnel (Sæther, 2005). 
In June 1997, activity based financing was introduced in Norwegian hospitals. Activity 
based financing is a system based on DRG (Diagnosis related groups) credits and became a 
part of the block-grant financing system. The aim of the new financing system was to 
increase the activity and to make a better allocation of resources. A few years later in 2001, 
free hospital choice was introduced. Free hospital choice gives patients the opportunity to 
choose which hospital to be treated in and is only applicable for non-acute treatment. The 
main aim of this reform was to achieve a better allocation of resources (Askildsen & Brekke 
2001).  
The 1st of January 2002 the Central government took over the responsibility of all public 
hospitals in Norway. Some of the intention of the reform was to do something about the long 
waiting lists for elective treatment and the lack of financial responsibility. After years with 
high deficits in the health care sector, the central government wanted to take the full and 
formal responsibility (Hagen & Kaarbø, 2004).  
In the same period as these reforms were implemented in the health care sector, several other 
trends and reforms initiatives have emerged. Since the 1990s there has been several family 
policy reforms that have entered the labour marked and imprinted the time allocation among 
men and women (Bø et al., 2008). Some of these reforms were the working time reforms in 
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1996 and 2003 that gave the hospital physicians a better basic wage and the employer an 
increased flexibility in working time and working time arrangements.   
In the labour supply of physicians the “normal” pattern has been to work extra hours in the 
main job and having a second position or an evening practice. Physicians have a tradition for 
long working hours and dedication to their profession, but this seems to be a shifting trend 
(Sæther, 2005). The patterns among younger physicians in Scandinavia has been shifting 
from long hours of work towards more family life and leisure (Sørensen et al, 2003) There 
also seems to be a trend among physicians to work more part time, especially among general 
practitioners where the majority are women (Elliott, 2003)  
Physicians in Norway do claim that they to a greater extend do more practical work which 
earlier was done by other health personnel, and it seems that physicians today spend more 
time on non-patient related work, like meetings, reporting, coding etc. This might be one of 
the effects of the several reforms which have taken place over the years (Aasland, 2006). 
Several studies have indicated that physicians spend less of their time on direct patient 
related work and that the productivity in work has decreased. This has lead to an increased 
attention on how the physician resources are administered and organized (Røhme & 
Kjekshus, 2001). 
In this thesis I will look at the time allocation and labour supply among hospital physicians, 
before and after the hospital reform of 2002 based on data material from two surveys done in 
2001 and 2006. I have following two research questions:  
1) Are there any changes in labour supply among hospital physicians from 2001 to 2006? 
I.e has hospital physicians increased or decreased their supply of working hours in this 
period? 
2) Are there any changes in the composition of this labour supply among physicians in this 
period? Or more specifically, do the physicians spend more or less of their working 
hours on patient related work? 
In order to see if there have been any changes I will to look at different factors that can 
contribute to describe the working patterns among physicians. The physicians` allocation of 
working time is modelled by several sets of independent variables in this thesis: (i) year, (ii) 
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gender, (iii) marital status, (iv) present physician position, (v) specialist approval, (vi) 
Present hospital ward, and (vii) Regional health enterprises. 
1.2 Background  
The shifting working patterns among physicians seem to be a result of organizational 
changes as well as shifting trends. The medical work force and the working patterns are not 
only changing in Scandinavia but also in other Western countries. Studies show that the 
average hours of work have decreased among physicians both in Canada, Australia and 
USA. Some of the explanations of these changes in labour supply can be explained by the 
aging workforce among physicians, the increasing number of female physicians who works 
part time, and changes in the work preferences among younger physicians (Crossley et al, 
2009)  
It seems to be a variation in time allocation among physicians. This may be due to the 
difference in work quantity at different wards in hospitals, numbers of physician specialities, 
leadership or the division of tasks. The working hours among physicians in Norway are 
relatively shorter than compared to other Western physicians. Even though the workweeks 
are shorter here in Norway, the Norwegian health care system scores high on international 
ratings of health care (Midttun, 2007). 
The literature on labour supply and behaviour of physicians holding jobs at hospitals is 
scarce (Baltagi et al., 2005). There has been an increasing interest in studying the economic 
behaviour in high-income individuals over the years. When studying high-income groups 
and labour supply, physicians has been of particular interest, because physicians are among 
the highest paid professional in the economy and their characteristics and work behaviour 
might say something about the high-income individuals in general (Showalter & Thurston, 
1996).  
1.3 Theories/Models  
Labour supply is decided by the number of hours a particular population desires to work in 
exchange for wages, and the number of working hours determines the individual labour 
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supply curve (Stiglitz & Walsh, 2002). This thesis is focusing on the labour supply in the 
physician market. Individuals have different tastes over non working time and consumption 
that can not be controlled for, and these unobservable factors can among other things be 
expected working hours, workload or challenges at work. These characteristics will in some 
cases determine the labour supply (Sæther, 2005) 
Physicians are working long hours, and this might be due to economic incentives or other 
attributes of the job. One way of estimating the economic incentives on the physicians 
labour supply, is to see the effects of the increased wages on the total working hours.  
The health care sector consists of many principal -agent relationships. The agency 
relationship is characterised by a principal and agent, that both wants to maximize their 
independent utility functions. Because of their diversity of interests and asymmetric 
information, the principal has to create a contract with the agent. The principal wants to 
motivate the agent to do what benefits the principal and this can be done by compensation 
rules or incentives. One incentive for the principal will be to attract the agent with higher 
payments. For the agent, the outcome will be a result of the payment (Mooney et al, 1993) 
The Norwegian health insurance system might give to high demand for health care services 
because of the low individual share and weak incentive to preventive effort. Solution to this 
is to increase the individual share or decrease the supply (Bjørvatn et al., 2002)  
If the information of the composition of patients is private, the people funding of the State 
will have limited information over the real composition of patients. Can the people funding 
trust the hospitals when they say they need more money? Does the low productivity reflect 
more high risk patients or lower efficiency at the hospital (Mcguire, 2000) 
To get the budget in balance, the producer will have incentives to focus on reducing quality 
and selection to save money. The combination might give better incentives to through 
optimal production. Higher individual grants might clear away some of the people that do 
not need that much health care. People with great need in health care can be people with 
limited revenue, which can be a problem if the individual grants increase (Bjørvatn, et al 
2002). 
If the insurer faces a hard budget constraint that cannot count on subsidies to cover financial 
losses, then an insurer who consistently attracts patients that are higher on risk than expected 
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will eventually go bankrupt, leaving its customers without cover. This can in theory not 
happen with the Norwegian health funding. The central government can not stop giving 
reimbursement to the health regions and the hospitals, and let people die (Mcguire, 2000). 
1.4 Material and method 
The data material in this thesis is based on second handed data and is collected from two 
surveys conducted in 2001 and 2006 on randomly collected public hospital physicians by the 
physician register.    
The aim of the survey in 2001 was for the physicians to evaluate the effects of the Activity 
Based Payment system (ABF) in Hospitals, the comprehension of ABF and to analyse 
possible effects of other alternatives. Besides collecting data about ABF, other conditions 
like management and organizing, purchase of services abroad, physicians working time and 
information about their wages was collected.  
In survey the survey of 2006, the physicians were asked to evaluate the situation in 2006 
with the situation before the hospital reform of 2002, and consider if the reform had 
achieved any of its goal. 
In 2001, the number of collected physicians was 2100, and after the second reminder the 
total respondents was 1131. This gives a total response rate on 54 %, but the response rate is 
down to 41 % on some of the questions. In 2006, 2500 physicians received the survey, 
where 1298 of the physicians responded after the first reminder. This gives a response rate 
on 53 %. 
The two data files have been merged together in one data file and I have compared the same 
questions that were used in both surveys. It is not known if the dataset is controlled for 
errors. There might be some imperfection in the data as people comprehend the data 
differently.  
From the dataset I will use the dependent variables as the share of patient related work and 
total working hours to see if there have been any changes in the labour supply among 
physicians after the hospital reform. The characteristics of the physicians are presented 
descriptively and are used as independent variables.  
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2. The Norwegian Health Care System 
2.1 The organizational structure 
The organizational structure of the Norwegian health care system is built on the principle of 
equal access to health care services. The health care sector in Norway and in Scandinavia are 
in general characterised as a decentralized NHS (National Health Service)-model. The 
funding is tax based, the actors mainly public, and the local and county government have 
important roles in decision making. With the implementation of the hospital reform in 2002, 
the Norwegian health care system changed from a decentralized to semi-centralized NHS 
(Hagen & Kaarbø, 2004).  
The hospital sector in Norway is characterized by restricted competition, in the sense that it 
has a limited number of hospitals in the marked and stringent establishment terms. The 
health care system has anyway been drawn to a more market based solutions like activity 
based financing and free choice of hospital (Askildsen & Brekke, 2001). 
In the period, 1970-2001, Norway was divided into nineteen counties that were responsible 
for the planning and operations of the local hospital sector (including somatic and 
psychiatric institutions) and other specialized medical services. The exception was the two 
highly specialized hospitals, the National Hospital (Rikshospitalet) and The Norwegian 
Radium Hospital (Radiumhospitalet) that already were owned by the central government. In 
1974, the nineteen counties were divided into five regional health enterprises (RHE), that 
obtained the organizational unit for coordination and steering, and each RHE got a 
University hospital. In 2002 the central government took over the ownership and the 
responsibility of all public hospitals in Norway (Hagen & Kaarbø, 2004). 
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2.1.1 The hospital reform of 2002 
The 1st of January 2002, the central government took over the responsibility of all public 
hospitals in Norway, including both somatic and psychiatric hospitals and other parts of 
specialist care (Hagen & Kaarbø, 2004).  
Some of the intention of the reform was to do something about the long waiting lists for 
elective treatment, lack of equity in the supply of hospital services and the lack of financial 
responsibility. After years with high deficits in the health care sector, the central government 
wanted to take the full and formal responsibility. The hospital reform was intended to 
increase the efficiency and to give patients a better proposition of specialist health care 
services. This could be done by making the specialist health care more efficient and to give 
patients a more equal treatment all over the country (Hagen & Kaarbø, 2004).  
In 2002, the central government took over the responsibility of the five health region that 
was established in 1974, and called them regional health enterprises (RHE). All the hospitals 
within RHE were named health enterprises and became legal objects with responsibilities for 
personnel as well as capital (Hagen & Kaarbøe, 2004). In June the 1st in 2007, Health 
Enterprise South and East were merged together as one Health Enterprise.   
 
CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 
RHE  RHE  
West 
RHE  
Middle 
RHE  
North South/East 
 
The owner of 14 public 
hospitals and have contracts 
with private institutions 
The owner of 4 public 
hospitals and have contracts 
with private institutions 
The owner of 4 public 
hospitals and have contracts 
with private institutions 
The owner of 4 public 
hospitals and have contracts 
with private institutions 
Figure 2.1- The four regional health enterprises anno 2007 
In the Western world the health care expenditures have expanded during the years without a 
corresponding increase in the productivity. This was also the tendency in the Norwegian 
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health system, and made a need for new ways of organizing hospitals and the health care 
services, to increase the control and efficiency (Kjekshus, 2003). 
With inspiration by the New Public Management (NPM) model, the hospital reform made a 
new way of organizing and managing hospitals. The aim of the NPM model is to increase 
the efficiency within the public sector and to increase the central governments control on the 
public sector. Public institutions like hospitals started using this model to increase the 
efficiency and create a freedom of choice for the citizens. The NPM model has been 
criticised and has its many issues. By using the NPM model in the hospital sector means 
more inequality in the admission to health services, more focus on profitable patients, less 
democratic control and more expenditure to the public (Eilertsen, 2003).  
When implementing the hospital reform, the central government changed the ownership and 
the structure, but not the financing system. Even though the ownership structure had 
changed, it did not give the hospitals incentives to change their behaviour. The central 
government wanted to place a weak discipline on the budget on the regional health 
enterprise itself, so that the incentive to keep the budget would increase (Tjerbo & Hagen, 
2005). 
2.2 The Norwegian financing system 
People that are liable to pay tax in Norway, pay through an obligatory tax system that 
contributes to the social insurance that pays physicians and hospitals for health production. 
In some cases, patients have to pay a small amount for consultations to the physician or at 
the hospital, but the cost is mainly covered by the public and/or the private insurance 
company. The Norwegian health system is basically public but some of the health system is 
based on private solutions, like dental health care (Askildsen & Brekke, 2001). 
There are two types of financing systems, prospective and retrospective financing. In a 
retrospective payments system the provider costs are fully reimbursed ex post. In this system 
the hospital will reimburse its cost from a third party. In a prospective payment system the 
provider payments rates or budgets are determined ex ante. This means that the hospitals are 
paid a fixed price per treatment, with an estimated cost based on Diagnosis Related Group 
(Askildsen & Brekke, 2001). 
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Since the 1970`s, several financing reforms has been introduced in the hospitals. In 1970 to 
1979, the hospitals implemented a financing system (“kurpengefinansiering”) based on a 
fixed price per patient for each day in hospital. In 1980 the block grant system was 
introduced, based on capitation system. The capitation system puts a price on the head of 
every member in the population in proportion to the composition and age structure. The 
block grant system, with a fixed transfer, did not give any incentives to increase the 
production. To increase the incentives towards a more efficient production, the Activity 
Based Financing (ABF) was introduced in 1997. The financing system in Norway consists of 
60 % block grants and 40% ABF. The ABF give incentives to increase the income in the 
hospitals, because in contrast to block grant financing, the ABF are dependent on the activity 
level (Bjørvatn et al., 2002). 
2.2.1 Introduction of the Activity Based Financing system (ABF) 
The 1st of July 1997, activity based payment system was introduced in every somatic 
hospital in Norway. ABF is a unit price system where the central government reimburse a 
share in accordance to the DRG system. DRG is based on a classification system where the 
price is designed on an average cost per treatment and the payments vary with the patients 
diagnose (Askildsen & Brekke, 2001).  
In the ABF system there are elements of competition that force the hospitals to be more cost 
efficient. The efficient hospitals get rewarded with their surplus, while the inefficient 
hospitals with their deficits are forced to be more efficient (Askildsen & Brekke, 2001). 
With ABF the hospitals carries all the risk with high risk patients. The activity based 
financing gives incentives to select low risk patients instead of high risk patients (Bjørvatn et 
al., 2002).  
The ABF give the hospital incentives to increase the patient treatments but it can also give 
an increased attention towards treating profitable patients. High powered prospective 
payment system, as ABF, increase efficiency, but may generate quality problems due to 
creaming, skimping and dumping (Askildsen & Brekke, 2001). According to Ellis (1998) 
people with more serious diseases are more expensive and demand more care (Ellis, 1998). 
If the payment system does not reimburse these fully costs, the hospitals might select away 
the high risk patients. While a retrospective payment system alone will offer the patients 
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more treatment than necessary, the prospective payment system may lead to cream 
skimming, by treating the profitable patients. By not giving optimal treatment for the 
expensive patients, this is due to something called skimping. If it is possible to reject 
patients, some of the expensive patients will not get any treatment at all this is called 
dumping (Askildsen & Brekke, 2001).      
The ABF contributed to an increase in hospital activities and reduced the waiting lists, but 
other factors as demographic change, technological development and an increase in wealth 
were also influencing (Sæther, 2005) 
Free choice of hospital 
Since the introduction of ABF, there has been an increase in the number of patients treated 
and a reduction in waiting time (Hagen & Kaarbø, 2004). This might also be an effect due to 
the free choice of hospital that was introduced in January 2001. With free choice of hospital 
all non-acute patients got the possibility to choose which hospital to be treated in, in 
Norway, hence the resource utilization was maximized. Since the price do not influence the 
patients` choice of hospital, other factors like distance to the hospital and family, waiting 
time and the quality of health services might influence the choice (Askildsen & Brekke, 
2001). 
Free choice of hospital and activity based financing contribute to a competition about 
patients among hospitals. In the hospital market we have “imperfect” competition with a 
limited number of hospitals and public regulations, which limits the establishment of new 
hospitals. Through ABF, the hospitals revenue is partly depended on number of treatments. 
To make this a situation of competition, the patients must get the information about the 
possibility of choosing hospital, and relevant information of potential hospitals (Askildsen & 
Brekke, 2001). 
2.2.2 Family policy reforms 
Several family policy reforms has entered the labour marked and imprinted the time 
allocation among men and women (Bø et al., 2008).  
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An implementation of working time reforms took place in 1996 and 2003, due to the lack of 
capacity among hospital physicians, long waiting lists of patients and vacant positions 
among health personnel. The working time reform in 1996 increased the working hours 
among physicians and the number of patient treatments. The reform of 2003 was based on 
the hospital reform in the year before, and increased the real wages of the physicians` and 
the flexibility in working time and working environment. The physician wages was 
characterised with a low basic wage and a big number of variable increments. A part of the 
wages that was related to inconvenient working time was now added in the basic wage. The 
basic wage increased by 2.5 hours per week, and the payment for working overtime and 
voluntary expanded overtime were reduced. The reform ensured that the physicians got a 
minimum wage that corresponded to the actually time they are working (The Norwegian 
Medical Association, 28.07.2005). 
The employers can enter voluntary contracts about expanded working time with the 
physicians. The system of voluntary contracts opens the possibility for individual variations 
in the physician wages and working time conditions, but it has to be agreed on between the 
Norwegian Medical Association and the employer (The Norwegian Medical Association, 
2005, 28.07.2005). 
2.3 Physician labour supply 
The characteristics about the medical profession are long working hours, and a sacrifice for 
the patient welfare above personal needs and family responsibilities. This characteristic still 
exists, although it may vary between specialities (Gjerberg, 2003). Long hours of work may 
be due to economic incentives or other attributes of the job. The attributes may be shift 
work, the possibility for maternity leave, workload, the challenge at work etc. This is 
characteristics that may determine the labour supply (Sæther, 2005). 
The labour market in Norway is characterized with centralized negotiations and powerful 
unions. Most of the physicians in Norway are represented by The Norwegian Medical 
Association (The Norwegian Medical Association, 2009) 
There seems to be tendency towards a change in working behaviour among physicians. This 
pattern is not only a case in Norway, but also a tendency in other parts of the world. The 
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average working hours has been decreasing in Canada, Australia and USA. The change in 
working hours may be attributed to an aging workforce among physicians, an increasing 
number of female physicians (more part time work), and different work preferences of 
younger physicians (Crossley et al., 2009) A decrease in labour supply can also be explained 
by the early retirement among physicians (Elliott, 2003). 
The changing work preferences might also be due to the fact that both male and female 
physicians today have spouses that have full-time careers, which create a set of family time 
constraints compared to earlier periods when the physician male was the only source of the 
household income. This will contribute to a decrease in physician labour supply (Crossley et 
al., 2009).  
There has been an increase in female physicians in the last decades. Still the women are 
underrepresented in the medical hierarchy and in the most prestigious specialties. The effect 
of gender on career pattern and family, do varies between specialities. In hospital based 
specialities it seems that men and women have similar career patterns. This can be due to 
organizational and structural circumstances and that work at hospitals implies long working 
hours that can be unpredictable, being on call and the scarcity of part time work (Gjerberg, 
2003).  
The scarcity of health personnel have been a constant problem for the central government 
over the years and the most important instrument towards this has been to increase the 
education capacity. The number of student places at medical school increased rapidly during 
the 1990s. Today, Norway is the country in the top coat when it comes to physician density 
(Aasland, 2006). In the period 2001-2006, the number of physicians increased by 
approximately 18.14 %, but this has not resulted in a growth in the activity (SSB, 2007). 
This should support the assumption on the demand side that the physicians has the 
possibilities to choose a job that combines a preferred set working hours and other attributes 
(Sæther, 2005).  
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
7242 7291 7592 7922 8199 8412 
Table 2-2- Physician man labour year in somatic hospitals in Norway in the period 2001-
2006 (SSB 2007) 
Despite an increase in the physician density in Norway there is still a number of vacant 
physician positions. One of the policy goals with NHS is to strengthen the physician services 
in health sectors in need and in the outskirts. Increased wages is a way to attract the 
physicians to work more. Many physicians have a second job in other hospitals or in evening 
practices. An increase in the public wage might influence the number of hours worked in the 
second job (Sæther, 2005).  
Compared to countries as Finland, Denmark and Germany, Norway has the highest health 
expenditure per inhabitant, the second highest physician coverage, but the lowest 
productivity. Compared to Finland, Norway has 42 % higher physician density. Despite the 
lower density in Finland, they also conscripted 79 % more patients than Norway. With a 
given activity level it seems that an increase in the doctor coverage might result in lower 
productivity. One of the reasons for this might be the differences in the composition of 
health personnel (Deloitte, 2008).   
The hospitals in Norway have long working shifts for physicians, and physicians can report 
that they are exhausted and concerned about the safety of their patients, but it seems to be an 
unacceptable culture for physicians to complain about being tired, because this is seen as 
disloyal (Hafstad, 2007). 
The Working Environment Act in Norway is going to make sure that all employees are 
having an acceptable working environment. Physicians are an exception from some of these 
determinations, especially when it concerns working time. According to regulations in the 
Working Environment Act, people shall not work more than 9 hours during 24 hours or 
increase above 40 hours per week. The physicians on the other hand, are able to work 
maximum 19 hours on every duty and maximum 60 hours per week. It can not be required 
that physicians have to work 38 to 40 hours per week, but most of them do so (The Medical 
Association, 2007).  
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Labour supply theory 
The analysis of the labour supply of an individual can be measured by two dimensions, the 
decision to work or not, and how much or how many hours you want to work if participating 
in the labour market (Stiglitz & Walsh, 2002). 
The decision about how much labour to supply is a choice between income and leisure, or 
consumption. Leisure can be defined as all the time an individual could potentially work and 
get paid, but instead is spending on non-work activities. When a person is giving up leisure 
and decides to work more, the person would receive more income and at the same time be 
able to increase its consumption. By working less and give up some consumption, a person 
will obtain more leisure. There are many ways in which people can influence how much 
labour they will supply. People have the flexibility in choosing a job that allows he/her to 
work the number of hours he/she wishes. In labour supply decisions, there are also trade-offs 
between consumptions and leisure, and trade-offs reflects opportunity costs. Opportunity 
cost of leisure is the forgone consumption that must be given up, and the opportunity cost 
depends on the wage you can get (Stiglitz & Walsh, 2002). 
The reason for the long working hours among physicians might be the economic incentives 
or other attributes of the job. It can be unobservable attributes that is affecting the labour 
supply, or characteristic attributes as working shifts, the possibility for maternity leave, 
expected working hours, workload, and challenge at work and so on (Sæther, 2005) 
The literature on labour supply and behaviour of physicians holding jobs at hospitals is 
scarce (Baltagi et al., 2005). There has been an increasing interest in studying the economic 
behaviour in high-income individuals over the years. When studying high-income groups 
and labour supply, physicians has been of particular interest, because physicians are among 
the highest paid professional in the economy, their characteristics and work behaviour might 
say something about the high-income individuals in general (Showalter & Thurstone, 1996).  
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Since physicians belong to a high-income group, the question is if the there is a positive 
labour supply response to wage increases, or if the income effect dominates the substitution 
effect (Baltagi et al., 2005). 
We expect that people wants to maximize their utility.  The satisfaction that consumers gets 
from having goods is usually called utility. The utility function of an individual depends on 
which goods that is consumed and the amount of that good. If a person wants to choose 
between two goods, in this case of wage and leisure, the utility function will be like in figure 
3.1. The utility function do illustrate that the marginal utility of a good is decreasing.  
Utility function: U = f (X1+X2) 
 
Wage                                                                              Wage 
 Leisure Leisure                         
    
Figure 3.1- Utility curve                                   Figure 3.2- Backward bending supply curve 
In labour supply theory the labour supply curve may slope downward or bend backward. If 
the curve bends backward (see figure 3.2) the explanation will be that the income effect 
dominates the substitution effect, meaning that a higher wage may result in a decrease in 
working time. A possibility of a backward bending supply curve in labour supply can be 
created by the opposing forces on income and substitution effects. The backward bending 
labour supply curve assumes that when a wage increase, then at a certain point the working 
hours will begin to decrease (Stiglitz &Walsh 2002). 
The focus on the marked of physicians has mainly been on the supply side, but there are also 
important aspects on the demand side that are disregarded. The vacant positions among 
physicians should support the assumption that it is few restrictions on the demand side, and 
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it is possible for the physicians to find the preferred combination of job and working hours. 
It is assumed that physicians makes choices about their labour supply from a finite set of job 
possibilities characterized by practice form, hours and wage rates (Sæther, 2005) This can be 
illustrated by an indifference curve where the combination of the good of working hours and 
leisure are indifferent to an indifference curve. An individual has the same utility along the 
indifference curve (See figure 3.3). 
Working hours 
U1 U0 
 Leisure 
Figure 3.3- Indifference curve 
The change in wages has an income- and a substitution effect. When the wages increase, a 
person is better off and will purchase more of all goods. This is called the income effect. If a 
person is willing to give up some of these good, like leisure and to work more, the person 
can get more of other goods. This is called the substitution effect (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002).  
The wage changes will be unaffected if the income- and substitution effect balance each 
other. When the substitution effect dominates, people will work more as the wages increase 
and trade off leisure for more income. This will give a normal case of an upward sloping 
labour supply curve. Another effect can be seen at high income wages. An increase in high 
income wages will outweigh the substitution effect, so that the labour effect decreases. This 
may be the case among high income professionals, like physicians, and result in a backward 
bending labour supply curve. According to the backward bending labour supply curve, 
people will work more until they reach a certain point where the labour supply decreases. 
People will then value leisure more and work less (Stiglitz & Walsh 2002).  
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To get health personnel to work in areas with special needs and accept jobs that have 
disadvantageous hours of work, like night work, then wage and other fees is seen as 
important. Since wages are the dominated cost, the health authorities in many countries tries 
to control this by influencing the health personnel`s choice of specialization, practice type 
and working hours (Sæther, 2005) 
In studies done on female labour supply, there is indicated that women that participating in 
the working life is responsive to changes in the wage rate, unearned income, the spouse`s 
income, marital status and having small children. According to a survey done by 
Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), the labour supply elasticities for females are positive, 
meaning that they are responding to a wage increase (Sæther, 2005). 
3.2 Principal-agent theory 
The Norwegian health care sector consists of a complicated network of principal- agent 
relations. In the principal-agent relationship, the principal engage another person(s) which 
become the agent, to perform a task on the behalf of the principal. There are number of 
principal-agent problems in the health care sector due to asymmetric information, moral 
hazard or adverse selection. In a principal-agent relationship the asymmetric information 
plays a great part. With asymmetric information, the agent has more information about the 
performance than the principal. One of the courses of action is to increase the control over 
the physicians (Smith et al., 1997). 
In a principal-agent relationship in the health care sector the participants can have different 
goals about how to allocate the resources. There are a number of possible ways of action 
towards the principal-agent problem in health care (Smith et al., 1997)  
ABF and free choice of hospital established a marked based system and competition in the 
health care sector. The health care system in Norway is influenced by the New Public 
Management model, which lead to a more marked based system (Askildsen & Brekke,  
2001).The ABF give economic incentives to increase the patient treatments, at the same time 
this may lead to cream skimming where the hospital choose to treat the most profitable 
patients (NOU, 1999) 
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With the introduction of the working time reform of 2003, it reduced hours of planned 
overtime. The incentive of the central government was to reduce the working hours of the 
physicians and reduce costs. This restriction did not reduce the possibility for the physicians 
to work more, since the physicians are free to combine their work at the hospital with a 
private practice. Another economic incentive for the physician to have a second job as 
private practice, is the possibility to deduct their practice related expenses from their wages 
in proportion to taxation (Sæther, 2005)  
Reducing costs was not the only incentive by the health authorities when introducing the 
ABF, but also to increase the efficiency and to reduce the waiting lists. There are a lot of 
challenges according to this. The health authorities must delegate responsibility to other 
regimes, as hospitals (agents) that will act on the behalf of the government (principal). The 
government demands about high cost efficiency might be against the health workers view 
about satisfying care, treatment or personal preferences. The waiting lists can be a way for 
the hospitals to show the government, that they need more money to be able to treat the 
patients in line. When the central government (principal) do not have the full information 
about the situation of the hospital (agent), the central government do not know whether the 
bad results are a result of missing action from the hospital, or if there are things the hospital 
can not control. This is a situation the agent can exploit against the principal and are due to 
asymmetric information problem (Askildsen & Brekke, 2001)  
Shift work has a documented negative impact on workers health and social life, effects that 
are compensated with higher wages and shorter working hours. If the hospital wants to 
attract the marginal worker by a wage increase, the hospital must also increase the wages of 
all physicians at the hospital. The factors that determine the earnings of the physicians are 
the formal qualifications, seniority and working hours. How many hours that a physician 
works in a week depend on the shift plan that the physicians share (Sæther, 2005). An 
increase in wages may result in less working hours. With the working time reform of 2003, 
the physicians got an increase in the real wages and the overtime payments were reduced. 
Increase in wages and more emphasize on real wages, might give the physicians an incentive 
to work less. 
A critical question in the principal-agent theory is how well the principal can observe the 
behaviour of the agent. The principal wants to give the agent incentives to make more effort, 
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but in order for this to occur, the agent must bear the risk. The agent is willing to bear the 
risk if he/she compensated for it, with higher income. The optimal contract is risk sharing 
between the principal and agent (Douma & Schreuder, 2002).  
Wages and fees are considered to be important in motivating people to work undesirable 
hours. In most countries the health authorities try to influence the behaviour of health 
personnel in choice of specialization, practice type and working hours. This can be done by 
regulations through quotas and are widely used in countries with National health services 
(NHS). Regulations in the quotas in medical school are an example of increasing the 
physician capacity in Norway. With deregulation of health systems, wage incentives seem to 
be important in implementing health policies. Wages is the most central policy variable used 
in NHS when implementing human resource. To understand the behaviour mechanism 
behind the change in wages related to the number of working hours is complicated. When 
estimating the impact of wage changes in the decision of labour supply, the tax schedule 
must be taken into consideration. The difficulties in measuring the tax schedule is that the 
individuals has different tastes in non-working time and consumption that cannot be 
controlled for (Sæther, 2005) 
3.2.1 Litterature search 
Since the literature on this topic is scarce, I have used Linda Midttun`s article “Medical 
specialists` allocation of working time” as a basis for searching for appropriate literature.  
Beside using some of the literature in Midttun`s article, I have used Google Scholar,  
PubMed, the Norwegian Medical Association`s homepage and the Physician Research 
Institute. I have also used different syllabus from my study. The most important words I 
have searched for were “labour supply” , “labour supply among physicians”, “time 
allocation among physicians”, “working time among physicians”, “physicians in Norway”, 
“Incentives in the health care sector” , “working time reforms”. The same search was done 
with Norwegian words as well. 
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3.2.2 Literature review 
According to several international studies the time allocation and labour supply among of 
general practitioners and medical specialists are related to factors as reimbursements system, 
patient demand and supply characteristics (Midttun, 2007). 
Killingworth (1988) notes that researchers have found factors as individual taste and that 
preferences have important effects on labour supply behaviour. Personal preferences may be 
captured through the physicians` self-reported preference for patient related work, 
administrative and research/educational tasks (Killingsworth, 1988) According to Midttun 
(2007) the physicians who are working in the public sector allocates more of their time to 
administrative and research/educational tasks. There have also been found that physicians 
that are working the fewest hours allocate time more proportionally to activities such as 
patient care than those who are working longer hours (Midttun, 2007).  
Time allocation of work may be different depending on type of physician speciality or 
position. In a time-mapping study performed in a maternity hospital and a medical ward in 
Trondheim, the results are showing great variation in time allocation among the physicians 
and that the working day for a physician varies a lot (Røhme & Kjekshus, 2001).  
There are said that physicians spend less time on patient related work than before. One of the 
reasons for this can be due to more detailed documentation in patient journals, which is very 
time-demanding for the physicians. The increasing demand for clinical and administrative 
documentation may lead to a decrease in patient related care. A study done in a hospital in 
Austria, reports that almost the same amount of time is spent on documentation as on direct 
patient care. The increasing need for documentation can harm the quality of the patient care. 
The Medical Association in Austria estimates that physicians do not spend more than 63% of 
their time on direct patient care (Ammenwerth et al, 2009)  
How physicians are allocating their work might also be affected by medical experience (age) 
and gender. With regards to gender, studies have shown that female physicians spend longer 
overall time on patient care. Older physicians normally have longer medical experience and 
will therefore be recruited to higher positions that spend more time on administrative and 
managerial duty, and less on direct patient related work (Midttun, 2007). 
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In the work paper of Sæther (2005), one of the concluding remarks is that high income group 
with full participation and many hours worked during a year is not responsive to wage 
increase in their total labour supply. Baltagi et al (2005) finds that physicians that work at 
hospital behave similarly to other employees and that the wage elasticities are positive, 
meaning that physicians do respond to a wage increase. The hospital physicians are among 
the high-income group in the population, but Baltagi et al (2005) means that they do not 
have to be anywhere near the backward-bending part of the supply curve.  
In the working paper of Sæther (2005) there is a limited response in the total labour supply 
to a wage increase in the literature for the physicians (Sæther, 2005). 
Studies done by Feenberg and Poterba (1993), and Feldstein (1995) on tax effect on labour 
supply for physicians, report that high income individuals are responding to incentives, but 
that the exact response to it is unclear. Other studies have not found such an effect for the 
high-income group (Sæther, 2005). 
3.2.3 Hypothesis 
In my two main hypothesis I want to test if the total working time have increased or 
decreased from 2001 to 2006, and how the share of the total working time is related to 
patient related work among hospital physicians in the same period. In addition to these two 
hypothesis I want to test if there are any difference in time allocation among different 
hospital wards.  
Hypothesis 1: There has been a reduction in the total working time among physicians, due to 
a general trend in the society in valuing more leisure and family life 
There seems to be a tendency and a trend among people today to value more leisure and less 
working hours. Although physicians have traditions for long working hours they seem to 
follow the same tendency, especially the younger physicians. With the working time reform 
in 2003, the physician got a wage increase. Both an increase in wages and in the real wages 
will result in less working hours, and we may assume that when high-income individuals 
increase their wages they will choose to work less. This might lead to an effect as in 
backward bending supply curve. The wage increase for the physicians implied an increase in 
the real wage and a decrease in the over time payments. If the payments are given per hour, 
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people will choose to work more than with a fixed payment then they will no longer have the 
same economic incentive to work more. Hence, according to these assumptions I assume that 
there has been a reduction in working time from 2001 to 2006.  
Hypothesis 2: The hospital physicians allocate less time on patient related work and more 
time on administrative work due to an increased bureaucracy by the hospital reform of 2002  
In the second hypothesis I will look at the share of patient related work among physicians. 
With the implementation of the hospital reform the hospital became more bureaucratized, 
and required more non-patient related assignments as clinical documentation, meeting, 
coding etc than before. This obliges the physicians to allocate less time on other 
assignments, as patient related work. Although it seems that physicians might allocate less 
time on patient related work, this assumption can also pull in the other direction. There have 
been an increase in newly qualified physicians over the past years, and with this increased 
capacity in man-labour years, more patient related work can be performed. Since there have 
been an increased bureaucracy and an increased documentation, I assume that there has been 
a reduction in patient related work.      
Hypothesis 3: There is a significant difference in time allocation among physicians working 
at different hospital wards. 
In the last hypothesis I want to see if there is any difference in how the physicians allocate 
their working time among different activities (patient related work, administrative work, 
research/education and other activities) in different hospital ward. Internal organising and 
personal preferences of the hospital physicians are assumed to influence how they allocate 
their work. Midttun (2007) indicate that field of speciality can be related in to time 
allocation, and that personal preferences on patient related work is positively associated with 
the time spent on that assignment. Time spent on other assignments is negatively associated 
with this preference. From these findings I assume that there are differences in time 
allocation in my sample of hospital physicians (Midttun, 2007). 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Method 
The data used in the analysis are second handed data, and is based on two different surveys 
done in respectively 2001 and 2006 . In the first survey in 2001, physicians were asked to 
give an evaluation on the activity based financing system of 1997, and in the second survey, 
the physicians were asked to evaluate the hospital reform of 2002. This is done by using the 
statistic method multivariate regression in SPSS. 
4.2 Analysis 
In this thesis I have used to analysis, an univariate and a linear regression analysis. 
Univariate analysis 
The Univariate analysis gives the frequency distribution on all the variables included in the 
analysis, both independent and dependent variables. These are listed in the chapter of 
descriptive statistics. 
 
Linear regression 
The linear regression analysis examines the linear relationship between a dependent and one 
independent variable. The linear regression estimates the effects the dependent variable has 
on an independent variable. Regression assumes that the dependent variables are normally 
distributed. Non-normally distributed variables can distort the relationship and the 
significance tests, and contribute to type I and type II errors.  
 
Standard multiple regression can only estimate the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables if the relationship are linear. If the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variable is not linear, the results of the regression will under estimate the 
true relationship. In a multivariate regression this non-linearity will increase the risk for type 
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I error, hence an over estimation. A multivariate regression makes it possible to test more 
than one variable and get a more complete explanation on the dependent variable. The 
dependent variable is often a result on several factors.  
4.3 Sample characteristics 
The two surveys are based on randomly collected public, hospital physicians by the 
Physician register. The total number of hospital physicians responding on the surveys was; 
n=1112 (2001) and n=1298 (2006). Among the respondents, 78 of the physicians were 
omitted from the analyses because of lack of data on allocation of working time between 
different assignments and general missing data on relevant variables. This give the total 
sample of 2332 physicians: n=1074 (2001) and n=1258 (2006).  
I have used the information about the characteristics of the physicians` from both surveys. 
The following characteristics are age, gender, marital status, number of children caring for, 
present position, present ward at the hospital, specialist approval, the number of gross wages 
in the main- and second job, and regional health enterprise. The gross wages are the only 
variable that is not used in the analysis, but is annotated through the thesis anyway. For a 
detailed description of all variables used in the estimation, this can be found in appendix 2.  
I will by a multivariate regression, use the characteristics about the physicians to control for 
the effect in total working hours and allocation of patient related care in 2001 and 2006. All 
the physicians are made anonymous, and no hospitals will be used in the analysis part, as I 
do not find it relevant in search for my research questions. I have used the RHE instead 
which gives a broader scope of the sample. An overview of the hospitals responded on the 
surveys can be found in appendix 1. 
In search for any changes in the labour supply of physicians in the period 2001 and 2006, 
following dependent variables have been used:  
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i. The total working hours among physicians in an average working week 
ii. The total hours spent on direct patient related work and other specific 
assignments in an average working week 
4.4 The questionnaires  
The two questionnaires used in 2001 and 2006 did not have the same design, but some of the 
same questions were used in both. The survey from 2001 was based on the effects of the 
activity based financing system and the survey from 2006 was based on the effects of the 
hospital reform. In this thesis, only the identical questions were used in the analysis. 
The respond rate on the survey in 2001 was 54% and some of the questions were down to 
41% response.  In 2006, the respond rate was 53 %. The numbers of the respond rate in both 
years, is considered to be high when take into consideration that the physicians are the target 
population. Refer to Midttun`s article (2007).    
On the front page of the questionnaires the respondents got information about the reason for 
this survey, based on some information about the particular reform, the financing partners, 
the randomization of the sample, information about confidentiality, what the data will be 
used for, the approximately time it takes for filling out and a name of a person to contact if 
there are any questions regarding the questionnaires.      
In the surveys the hospital physicians were asked to state how many hours they worked at 
the hospital in an average week and to specify how these hours were allocated on different 
assignments listed in table 4.1. These are my main variables. Some of the assignments have 
been merged together into categories. Assignments as meeting, management and personnel 
administration, administrative medical work, and telephone/electronic communication have 
been grouped into the category “administration”.  Research and teaching has also been 
grouped into one category. Patient related work is the only assignment that has its own 
category. 
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Categories of work within the hospital 
Categories of work: 
1) Direct and indirect patient related work 
2) Adminstrative work 
Meetings 
Management and personnel administration 
Administrative medical work (journaling, epicrisis writing, DRG coding, archiving, prescriptions, various 
certificates) 
Telephone and electronic communication beyond patient related work 
3) Research 
4) Teaching/training 
5) Other activities 
6) The average number of working hours within the hospital in a week 
  
Table 4.1- Categories of different assignments within the hospital 
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5. Descriptive statistics 
In this chapter I will present the frequency data in 2001 and 2006, on age, gender, marital 
status, present care of children, present position, hospital ward, specialist approval and 
regional health enterprises. The frequency of the physician characteristics, are represented in 
following tables, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, but only the characteristics in 5.1 and 5.2 are used in the 
analysis.  
 2001 2006 Total (2001-2006) 
    
Gender Frequency (%) Frequency (%)   
Men 779 (72,9 %) 814 (66,6 %) 1593 (69,5 %) 
Women 290 (27,1 %) 408 (33,4 %) 698 (30,5 %) 
Missing 5 36 41 
Total 1069 1222 2291 
Age       
20-29 35 (3,3 %) 52 (4,2 %) 87 (3,8 %) 
30-39 326 (30,5 %) 404 (32,9 %) 730 (31,8) 
40-49 335 (31,3 %) 344 (28 %) 679 (29,5 %) 
50-59 267 (25 %) 267 (21,7 %) 534 (23,2 %) 
60-69 106 (9,9 %) 159 (12,9 %) 265 (11,5 %) 
70 or more 1 (0,1 %) 2 (0,2 %) 3 (0,1 %) 
Missing 4 30 34 
Total 1070 1228 2298 
Marital status       
Unmarried/singel 78 (7,3 %) 99 (8,1 %) 177 (7,7 %) 
Married/cohabitant 911 (85,3 %) 1046 (85,2 %) 1957 (85,3%) 
Divorced/separated 70 (6,6 %) 73 (5,9 %) 143 (6,2 %) 
Widow(er) 9 (0,8 %) 8 (0,7 %) 17 (0,7 %) 
Missing 6 32 38 
Total 1068 1226 2294 
Children    
0 395 (37,1 %) 465 (38,2 %) 860 (37,7 %) 
1 164 (15,4 %) 199 (16,3 %) 363 (15,9%) 
2 292 (27,4 %) 316 (25,9 %) 608 (26,6 %) 
3 165 (15,5 %) 178 (14,6 %) 343 (15 %) 
4 45 (4,2 %) 45 (3,7 %) 90 (3,9 %) 
5 4 (0,4 %) 14 (1,1 %) 18 (0,8 %) 
6 0 (0 %) 1 (0,1 %) 1 (0 %) 
7 1 (0,1 %) 0 (0 %) 1 (0 %) 
Missing 8 40 48 
Total 1066 1218 2284 
   Table 5.1- Distribution of gender, age and marital status 
 
 
As illustrated in table 5.1, the gender distribution in the 2001 and 2006 is skewed. The 
majority of the hospital physicians responded on the two surveys is men. This is not 
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surprising when we know that the majority of physicians in Norway are men. The number of 
respondents increased for both genders from 2001 to 2006. The male respondents increased 
approximately by 4% and the female respondents increased by almost 30%.  The high 
increase among female physicians can be a sporadic effect or an effect on the increase of 
female physicians in the last years.  
The distribution in the responsiveness is lower in the younger age groups (20-29) and 
highest in the middle age groups (30-50), and decreases with the higher age groups (60-
70+). These numbers are to be expected when considering that becoming a specialist takes 5 
years after finishing medical school therefore it is logic that it is few respondents in the 
lowest age group. The decrease in the higher age groups might be due reasons as retirement. 
The age groups are also higher in 2006, and this might explain the higher frequency in 
higher positions. The category “others” is not specified.  
The majority of the physicians in the two surveys are married or have a cohabitant. The 
number of the marital status is also increasing from 2001 and 2006. This can also be an 
effect of the increasing age in the groups responding in 2006. 
The average number of children, caring and control for is almost the same in both years.  
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 2001 (total) 2006 (total)     
     
Present position Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Men  Women 
Unit Chief Physician /Clinic 
Chief 164 (19,1 %) 271 (22,2 %) 341 93 
Section Chief Physician 155 (18 %) 525 (43 %) 492 183 
Chief Physician 296 (34,4 %) 163 (13,4 %) 321 137 
Consultant Chief Physician 232 (27 %) 99 (8,1 %) 191 139 
Other 13 (1,5 %) 162 (13,3 %) 95 79 
Missing 214 38 153 67 
Total 860 1220 1440 631 
Different hospital wards         
Ophthalmology 21 (2,6 %) 27 (2,2 %) 30 18 
Otorhinolaryngology  29 (3,6 %) 34 (2,8 %) 50 12 
Surgical ward 96 (11,8 %) 162 (13,3 %) 204 54 
Orthopaedics 59 (7,3 %) 67 (5,5 %) 109 16 
Neurological ward 40 (4,9 %) 64 (5,3 %) 56 48 
Laboratory 40 (4,9 %) 72 (5,9 %) 70  41 
Anaesthesiology 82 (10,1 %) 123 (10,1 %) 166 39 
Medical ward 189 (23,3 %) 261 (21,4 %) 333 116 
Radiotherapy department 52 (6,4 %) 92 (7,6 %) 85 58 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 54 (6,7 %) 89 (7,3 %) 82 61 
Other hospital ward 149 (18,4 %) 227 (18,6 %) 230 142 
Missing 263 40   
Total 811 1218 1415 605 
Specialist approval  743 (69,4 %) 797 (66,3 %)    
Yes  3 55 1163 369 
No 743 797 410 322 
Region (RHE)         
Region 1 – South 459 406 584 267 
Region 2 – East 156 332 347 131 
Region 3 – West 184 247 293 131 
Region 4 – Middle 153 146 198 92 
Region 5 – North 91 123 143 71 
Total 1043 1254 1565 692  
Table 5.2- Distribution on position, hospital ward, specialist approval and region 
The distribution of physicians in different positions is skewed both in category year and 
gender. One of the reasons for this might be the higher respondents in 2006 than in 2001, 
higher missing data in 2001, and the fact that men are the majority. The age groups are 
higher in 2006, and this might also explain the higher frequency in higher positions. The 
total respondents with speciality approvals have had modest increase.  
The distribution of physicians in different hospital wards in 2001 and 2006, are a little bit 
skewed in the surgical ward, medical ward, and among physicians working in other wards. 
This m ay be due to a higher missing rate in 2001 and the higher number of total respondents 
in 2006. 
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 Within Within Outside Outside 
  2001 2006 2001 2006 
      
Gross Wages Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
0-150 000 NOK 6 (0,6%) 6 (0,5%) 716 (67,4%) 1570 (83,2%) 
150 000-299 000 NOK 26 (2,5 %) 15 (1,2 %) 240 (22,6 %) 61 (6,1 %) 
300 000-449 000 NOK 169 (15,9 %) 78 (6,3 %)  67 (6,3 %) 22 (2,2 %) 
450 000-599 000 NOK 351 (33,1 %) 292 (23,5 %) 19 (1,8 %) 21 (2,1 %) 
600 000-749 000 NOK 349 (32,9 %) 368 (29,6 %) 7 (0,7 %) 20 (2,0 %) 
750 000-899 000 NOK 137 (12,9 %) 293 (23,6 %) 7 (0,7 %) 27 (2,7 %) 
900 000-1100 000 NOK 20 (1,9 %) 160 (12,9 %) 5 (0,5 %) 14 (1,4 %) 
>1 100 000 NOK 3 (0,3 %) 30 (7,8 %) 1 (0,1 %) 4 (0,4 %) 
Total responded 1061 1242 1062 1003 
Missing 13 16 12  
 
Table 5.3- Gross wages in the main job at the hospital and in the second job outside the 
hospital 
 
 
The data on the gross wages represent the wages in the year before the survey was done, i.e. 
2000 and 2005. The total respondents do not differ that much, and the missing data is low. 
When comparing the data on wages within the hospital, it has decreased in the lower 
categories in 2006, but increased in the higher wage categories. This might has something to 
do with the increase in the real wages for the physicians in 2003. Another reason for this 
wage increase might be that there are more physicians in higher positions in 2006 than 2001. 
Higher positions will have a higher wage. In table 6.3, we can see that the total working 
hours has decreased by approximately 0.5 hour in 2006. This might be an modest effect of 
the working time reform or just a coincidence. 
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6. Labour supply 
Hypothesis: There has been a reduction in the total working time among physicians, due to a 
general trend in the society in valuing more leisure and family life 
6.1 Total working hours 
The labour supply of an individual may depend on whether to work or not, and how many 
hours a person prefer to work. How many hours a person prefers to work, may vary through 
life depending on many factors.  
A multi regression analysis is performed on the time allocation among hospital physicians in 
2001 and 2006. The independent variables, treated as dummies, are year (2006 as reference), 
age (40-49 as reference), gender (woman as reference), position (Unit Chief/Clinic Chief as 
reference), specialist approval No specialist approval as reference), marital status (widow as 
reference), hospital ward (Radiotherapy ward as reference) and Region (North as reference) 
to see if they have any effects on the total working time. The dependent variable in this 
analysis is total working time among the physicians. The descriptive statistics for this 
analysis is represented in table 5.21 and 5.2.The results from the multivariate regression are 
reported in table 6.2. 
Total working hours in 2001 and 2006
45 44,75
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Year
W
or
ki
ng
 h
ou
rs
2001
2006
Figure: 6-1- Total working hours in 2001 and 2006  
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Variables B Std.error Sig 
        
Constant 43.474 2.660 .000 
Year 1.006 .435 .021 
Gender .819 .409 .046 
Age 20-29 1.459 1.127 .196 
Age 30-39 .938 .594 .115 
Age 50-59 .981 .543 .071 
Age 60-69 -1.393 .718 .053 
Age 70 or more -2.815 5.463 .606 
Section Chief Physician -2.544 .516 .000 
Chief Physician -2.680 .640 .000 
Consultant Chief Physician -4.086 .876 .000 
Other position -2.936 .909 .001 
Speciality approval 1.160 .679 .088 
Ophthalmology -1.948 1.326 .142 
Otorhinolaryngology  -3.096 1.181 .009 
Surgical ward 3.397 .813 .000 
Orthopaedics 4.319 .963 .000 
Neurological ward .390 1.007 .699 
Laboratory .418 .989 .673 
Anaesthesiology 1.045 .851 .219 
Medical ward 1.412 .750 .060 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 1.239 .919 .177 
Other hospital ward .739 .765 .335 
Number of children -.276 .170 .105 
Region 1 -1.984 .641 .002 
Region 2 -1.114 .689 .106 
Region 3 -1.865 .699 .008 
Region 4 -1.703 .753 .024 
Unmarried/singel 2.579 2.535 .309 
Married/cohabitant 2.566 2.444 .294 
Divorced/separated .935 2.529 .712 
 Table 6.2- A multivariate regression on total working hours in 2001 and 2006 
                   
 
Dependent variable: Total working hours 
                         
Reference categories: Year 2006, women, Age-40-49, Unit Chief Physician/Clinic Chief, no   
Specialist approval, Radiotherapy ward, Region 5, divorced 
 
The regression equation:  
Working time = β0 + β2 * Year + β3 * gender + β4 * age + β5 * position + β6 * specialist 
approval + β7 * hospital ward + β8 * number of children + β9 * Region + β10 * Marital 
status 
The adjusted R-square is 0.07 and tells us that 7 % of the variation in the share of total 
working hours is explained by variations in the independent variables.  
 39
In table 6.2 we can see the effects of the independent variables listed in column B which is 
the unstandardized regression coefficients that examine the average change in total working 
hours when value of the independent variables increases with one unit. 
The variables in the regression that are significant (at a 0.05 sig.level) with total hours of 
work, are year, gender, position , Otorhinolaryngology ward, Surgical ward, Orthopaedics, 
Region 1, 3 and Region 4. 
From the regression in table 6.2 we can see that the bivariate effect is less than the controlled 
effect in total working hours (see figure 6.1). This indicates that there are other factors that 
influence the working time. From the regression (table 6.2) we can see that the physicians 
have reduced their working time by approximately 1 hour from 2001 to 2006. 
The Unit Chief/Clinic Chief worked significantly more than the other positions. The 
explanation for this difference might be that higher positions are often correlated with more 
working hours.When controlling for different wards, with the Radiotherapy ward as the 
reference category, Otorhinolaryngology ward works significantly fewer hours than the 
Radiotherapy ward, and the Surgical and the Orthopaedics ward works significantly more. 
This may be due to coincidences or it may be differences between the different hospital 
wards.From the variable Region we can see that all the Regions are working less than 
Region 5 (North), but only Region 1 (South), Region 3 (West), Region 4 (Middle) is 
working significantly fewer hours than Region 5. 
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Figure 6.3- Total working hours outside the hospital in 2001 and 2006 
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7. Patient related work 
Hypothesis: The hospital physicians allocate less time on patient related work and more 
time on administrative work, due to an increased bureaucracy by the hospital reform of 
2002  
7.1 The total hours of patient related work 
I have used a multivariate regression analysis to test the hypothesis. The total share of 
patient related work is presented in appendix 1 and in figure 7-1. The descriptive statistics 
for this analysis is represented in table 5.1 and 5.2.  
The dependent variable in this analysis is the share of patient related work, and the 
independent variables are that are treated as dummies are year (2006 as reference), age (with 
40-49 as reference), gender (women as reference), marital status (widow as reference), 
present position (Unit Chief/Clinic Chief as reference), specialist approval (no specialist 
approval as reference), Region (with Region 5 as reference). 
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Figure 7-1 Total patient related work in hospitals in the period 2001 and 2006 
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Variables B Std.error Sig 
        
Constant 49.624 6.471 .000 
Year -3.161 1.068 .003 
Gender -2.504 1.009 .013 
Age 20-29 1.815 2.748 .509 
Age 30-39 1.660 1.458 .255 
Age 50-59 .960 1.333 .472 
Age 60-69 1.308 1.765 .459 
Age 70 or more 21.259 13.276 .109 
Section Chief Physician 11.561 1.271 .000 
Chief Physician 13.453 1.570 .000 
Consultant Chief Physician 11.182 2.144 .000 
Other position 10.243 2.222 .000 
Speciality approval -.253 1.660 .879 
Ophthalmology -13.608 3.265 .000 
Otorhinolaryngology  -12.722 2.908 .000 
Surgical ward -22.552 2.015 .000 
Orthopaedics -20.437 2.374 .000 
Neurological ward -28.717 2.478 .000 
Laboratory -23.990 2.446 .000 
Anaesthesiology -9.003 2.106 .000 
Medical ward -26.657 1.857 .000 
Obstetrics/gynaecology -19.517 2.270 .000 
Other hospital ward -26.639 1.894 .000 
Number of children .550 .419 .190 
Region 1 -.069 1.572 .965 
Region 2 .339 1.691 .841 
Region 3 .036 1.722 .983 
Region 4 1.966 1.842 .286 
Unmarried/singel 17.741 6.161 .004 
Married/cohabitant 15.991 5.939 .007 
Divorced/separated 13.334 6.152 .030 
                    Table 7.2- Multivariate regression on patient related work 
 
Dependent variable: Share of patient related work 
                         
Reference categories: Year 2006, women, Age-40-49, Unit Chief Physician/Clinic Chief, No                
speciality approval, Radiotherapy ward, Region 5, Divorced 
                
 
The regression equation for this analysis is:  
 
The total share of patient related work = = β0 + β2 * Year + β3 * gender + β4 * age + β5 * 
position + β6 * specialist approval + β7 * hospital ward + β8 * number of children + β9 * 
Region + β10 * Marital status 
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The adjusted R-square is 0,206 tells us that 20.6 % of the variation in the share of patient 
related work is explained by the variations in the independent variables.  
The regression results show that the physicians worked approximately 3% less with patient 
related work in 2001 than in 2006. In figure 7.3, when not taking the total share into 
consideration, we can see there is a modest increase in patient related work by 
approximately 1 hour.   
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Figure 7.3- Total working hours of patient related work in 2001 and 2006 
We can also see from analysis that it is a significant difference in gender. Men are on 
average working 2 % less on patient related work than women.  
In the analysis we can see that the Radiotherapy ward do work significantly more with 
patient related work than the other wards. This indicates that the allocation of working time 
varies between different wards. 
When it comes to marital status the reference category widow(er) are working fewer hours 
than those with status as divorced/separated, married/cohabitant or unmarried. The 
explanation for this might be that people that are widows often become this in a higher age 
and higher age correlate with higher positions (often do so). This makes sense when we look 
at the variable, present position. Unit Chief/Clinic Chief are allocating significantly less time 
on patient related work than the other position. The explanation for this might be that the 
 43
Unit Chief/Clinic Chief is working with more administrative tasks than the other positions 
and not so much in the clinic.  
There are been claimed that the physicians today spend more time on non-patient related 
work, due to increasing administrative work which might have been an effect due to the 
hospital reform. In this analysis we can see that hospital physicians worked 3% less with 
patient related assignments in 2001 than 2006. This indicates that the hospital reform did not 
have that strong negative effect on the allocation of patient related work after all. 
Hypothesis  
Hypothesis: There is a significant difference in time allocation among physicians working at 
different hospital wards. 
The total hours worked in different hospital wards, can be found in table the multivariate 
regression in table 6.2.The regression indicates that there are significant differences in total 
working hours between some of the wards when using Radiotherapy as the reference 
category.  
To see if there is any significant difference in time allocation between the different hospital 
wards, a multivariate regression are done with four dependent variables; (i) patient related 
work, (ii) administrative work, (iii) research/education and (iiii) other work. The 
independent variables used are year (dummies), age, gender, speciality approval (dummies), 
position, marital status, hospital ward (dummies) and region. The different activities are 
grouped into categories of work, see 4.1 and descriptive statistics can be found in appendix 
2. 
In table 4.1, we can see there is a difference in time allocation between different hospital 
wards. There are specially three wards that stands out from the other wards in allocation of 
working time, and that is the Radiotherapy ward, the Neurological ward and the Laboratory 
ward. On average, the Radiotherapy ward are spending the most time on patient related work 
compared with the other wards, but is also the ward that spends less time on administrative, 
research/education and other activities. The Neurological ward is spending the most time on 
administrative work and the fewest hours on patient related work. The Laboratory ward does 
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allocate less of the time on research/teaching and the most of the time on other activities. 
This seems to the tendency in both 2001 and 2006. 
 
Variables B Std.error Sig 
 Constant 33,08 1,861 0 
Ophthalmology -6,494 1,638 0 
Otorhinolaryngology  -7,661 1,456 0 
Surgical ward -7,798 1,005 0 
Orthopaedics -6,408 1,186 0 
Neurological ward -12,129 1,238 0 
Laboratory -10,784 1,214 0 
Anaesthesiology -3,346 1,049 0,001 
Medical ward -10,846 0,924 0 
Obstetrics/gynaecology -7,725 1,134 0 
Other hospital ward -11,007 0,946 0 
Year -1,007 0,457 0,028 
Gender -0,651 0,497 0,191 
Speciality approval 1,323 0,719 0,066 
Age -0,42 0,279 0,133 
Marital status -1,345 0,546 0,014 
Position 0,86 0,269 0,001 
Region 0,252 0,160 0,115 
                          Table 7.3- Regression on direct patient related work 
Dependent variable: Direct patient related work 
Reference category: Radiotherapy ward 
 
The regression equation: 
 
Direct patient related care = β0 + β1 * hospital ward + β3 * Year + β4 * Gender + β5 * 
Specialist approval + β6 * Age + β7 * Marital status + β8 * Position + β9 * Region 
 
The adjusted R-square is 0,125 and tells us that 12.5 % of the variation in the share of 
patient related work is explained by variations in the independent variables.  
 
In table 7.3, a multivariate regression analyses is done on allocation on patient related work 
between different hospital wards. All the hospitals wards are allocating significantly less 
hours than the Radiotherapy ward. We can see that marital status and present position is 
significant in allocating patient related work. When controlling for the independent variable 
year, it also gave significant effects. It was allocated 1 hour less direct patient related work 
in 2001.  
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Variables B Std.error Sig 
Constant 16,746 2,008 0 
Ophthalmology 4,742 1,666 0,004 
Otorhinolaryngology  6,286 1,631 0 
Surgical ward 10,422 1,114 0 
Orthopaedics 9,974 1,304 0 
Neurological ward 11,998 1,352 0 
Laboratory 6,597 1,324 0 
Anaesthesiology 5,019 1,184 0 
Medical ward 11,476 1,038 0 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 8,799 1,233 0 
Other hospital ward 10,835 1,067 0 
Year 2,061 0,479 0 
Gender 0,445 0,523 0,395 
Speciality approval -3,176 0,771 0 
Age -0,089 0,3 0,767 
Marital status -0,436 0,569 0,444 
Position -2,439 0,288 0 
Region -0,117 0,169 0,488 
                    Table 7.4- Regression on administrative work 
 
Dependent variable: Administrative work 
Reference category: Radiotherapy ward 
 
The regression equation: 
 
Administrative work: β0 + β1 * hospital ward + β3 * Year + β4 * Gender + β5 * Specialist 
approval + β6 * Age + β7 * Marital status + β8 * Position + β9 * Region 
 
The adjusted R-square is 0,151 tells us that 15.1 % of the variation in the share of patient 
related work is explained by variations in the independent variables.  
In table 7.4, all the hospitals in the analysis are allocating more hours on administrative work 
than the Radiotherapy ward, with significant results. The variable year, specialist approval 
and present position also give significant results. It was allocated 2 hours more on 
administrative work in 2001. 
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Variables B Std.error Sig 
Constant -0,815 1,126 0,469 
Ophthalmology 0,218 0,965 0,821 
Otorhinolaryngology  0,571 0,881 0,517 
Surgical ward 1,254 0,603 0,038 
Orthopaedics 1,373 0,71 0,053 
Neurological ward 1,822 0,756 0,016 
Laboratory 3,461 0,741 0 
Anaesthesiology 0,73 0,64 0,255 
Medical ward 1,539 0,558 0,006 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 0,975 0,684 0,154 
Other hospital ward 1,351 0,572 0,018 
Year -0,38 0,274 0,166 
Gender 0,732 0,296 0,014 
Speciality approval 1,873 0,433 0 
Age 0,034 0,17 0,844 
Marital status 0,335 0,326 0,304 
Position 0,23 0,164 0,159 
Region 0,019 0,097 0,848 
                     Table 7.5- Regression on research and education                    
      
Dependent variable: Research and education 
Reference category: Radiotherapy ward 
 
The regression equation: 
Research and Education = β0 + β1 * hospital ward + β3 * Year + β4 * Gender + β5 * 
Specialist approval + β6 * Age + β7 * Marital status + β8 * Position + β9 * Region 
 
The adjusted R-square is 0,034 tells us that 3.4 % of the variation in the share of patient 
related work is explained by variations in the independent variables.  
In table 7.5, the hospital wards that significantly spend more time on education/research, are 
the Surgical ward, Neurological ward, Laboratory ward, Medical ward, other wards. There 
are no significant differences when controlled for year 
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Variables B Std.error Sig 
Constant -0,821 0,617 0,184 
Ophthalmology 0,645 0,543 0,235 
Otorhinolaryngology  0,491 0,483 0,309 
Surgical ward 0,389 0,333 0,243 
Orthopaedics 0,514 0,393 0,191 
Neurological ward 0,359 0,41 0,382 
Laboratory 2,527 0,402 0 
Anaesthesiology 0,58 0,348 0,096 
Medical ward 0,362 0,306 0,237 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 0,686 0,376 0,068 
Other hospital ward 0,607 0,314 0,053 
Year 0,377 0,152 0,013 
Gender 0,156 0,165 0,343 
Speciality approval 0,357 0,238 0,134 
Age 0,204 0,093 0,028 
Marital status -0,208 0,181 0,249 
Position 0,3 0,089 0,001 
Region 0,016 0,053 0,762 
                   Table 7.6- Regression other work assignments 
                    
 
Dependent variable: Other work assignments 
               
Reference category: Radiotherapy ward 
 
 
The regression equation: 
 
Other work activities = β0 + β1 * hospital ward + β3 * Year + β4 * Gender + β5 * Specialist 
approval + β6 * Age + β7 * Marital status + β8 * Position + β9 * Region 
 
The adjusted R-square is 0,031 tells us that 3.1 % of the variation in the share of patient 
related work is explained by variations in the independent variables.  
In table 7.6, the allocation of time on other activities was significantly higher in the 
laboratory ward, in 2001, with increased age and present position when compared to the 
Radiotherapy ward. 
 
The four regression analysis on time allocation between different hospital wards, indicates 
that there are differences in how the different hospital wards allocate their work. 
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8. DISCUSSION 
8.1 Hypothesis 
The main aim of this study was to see if there have been any changes in working time and 
patient related work among hospital physicians in the period 2001 and 2006. The hypothesis 
tested: 
i. There has been a reduction in the total working time among physicians, due to a 
general trend in the society in valuing more leisure and family life 
ii. The hospital physicians allocate less time on patient related work and more on 
administrative work, due to increased bureaucracy by the hospital reform of 2002. 
iii. There is a significant difference in time allocation among physicians working at 
different hospital wards. 
8.1.1 Labour supply 
It seems to be a shifting trend among younger physicians towards valuing more family life 
and leisure. Physicians are known for long working hours and dedication to their work, and a 
normal pattern has been to have a second job in another hospital or in a private practise. 
Male physicians have been dominating the profession for decades, and developed patterns 
that are impressed by men.  
The changing patterns may also be an effect of the organizational changes in the last 
decades, due to several reforms that have influenced the labour supply of men and women. 
The entry of female physicians, are also contributing to change in a rather male dominated 
profession. It is indicated that female physicians reduce the working hours because of more 
part time and maternity leaves. Studies have shown that this might be a pattern among 
female general practitioners, but this seems not to be the case among public female 
physicians due to long work shifts and on-call commitments. 
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In the regression on total working hours, we can see that there has been a modest decrease in 
total working time with approximately 1 hour in 2006.  
There also seems to be a gender difference in working time. Men have increased their total 
working time by approximately 1 hour more than the female physicians in 2006.. This can be 
random result, or a result of women working more part time. Studies show that female 
physicians are still more affected by family responsibilities than the male physicians, but in 
hospital based specialities men and women seems to have the similar career patterns. This 
can have something to do with the structural/organizational circumstances at the hospital. 
The gender difference in working time might also be due to the fact that men are the 
majority sitting in higher positions, and that higher position corresponds with more working 
hours. As we can see from the results, the Unit Chief/Clinic Chief is the position with the 
most hours of work, and that the number of working hours decreases with the decreasing 
positions.  
There are also significant differences in working time among different hospital wards. This 
can be due to the composition of the health personnel within the hospital wards or it may be 
that different wards require different amount of work. There is also significant differences 
between the RHE`s. The Region North is working the most, and this might be due to 
demographic differences in the population or be due to the different wage systems. The 
hospital physicians in RHE, North, have higher wages than the other physicians in RHE`s 
(Hagen, 2009) This may be due to the incentive system that seeks to attract physicians in 
areas that are less attractive and that require more capacity.   
Along with the working time reform in 2003, the real wages increased and the overtime 
payments reduced. When high-income individual get a wage increase they might want to 
reduce their working time, and this can be due to a backward bending supply. It is not 
possible to draw any conclusion from my regression about the decrease in total working 
time, but it might give an indication. In this case, it can be indicated that the wage increase 
might have played a modest role in the reduction of working time. The decrease in total 
working time might also be due to the fact that there is a general tendency in the population 
where people are valuing more leisure than work.  
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8.1.2 Patient related work 
Physicians in Norway do claim that they to greater extend than earlier do more practical 
work which was earlier done by other health personnel, and they do more of non-patient 
related work as meetings, coding, reporting etc. This could be one of the effects of the 
hospital reform. Several studies can report that physicians have decreased their time on 
patient related assignments and productivity.  
Due to the hospital reform there has been an increased bureaucracy in hospitals in proportion 
to more documentation and administrative work among the physicians. Hence, we would 
expect less patient related work due to this, but instead there is an opposite tendency. From 
the result we can see that the physicians are allocating approximate 3% more on patient 
related work in 2006. This constitutes approximately 1 hour more.   
In the regression of patient related work we can see that there is a gender difference, where 
men are working 2.5 % less than the women. This supports the studies that report that female 
physicians spend longer overall time on patient care. This may have something to do with 
the gender distribution in different positions that might affect how the physicians allocate 
their working time. I assume that it is differences in the workload and in the composition of 
work between different positions and hospital wards. Men are the majority in higher 
positions in the analysis. The Unit Chief/Clinic Chiefs are working significantly less with 
patient related work than the other positions, and are also the position that are working the 
most of them all. It seems that the relative time spent on administrative work and on 
research/education assignments, do increase with longer working hours (see Midttun, 2007). 
This supports the argument that men are represented in higher positions, and along with this, 
do allocate less time on patient related work. When due to marital status widow(er) spend 
less time on patient related work than the physicians that are not widows. People usually 
become a widow(er) in a high age, and with higher age, people usually have more 
experience and are therefore working in higher positions. As exemplified earlier, with 
increasing experience and longer working hours, hence the patient related work seems to be 
reduced. 
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8.1.3 Time allocation at hospital wards 
Differences in time allocation may be due to the difference in the work quantity at different 
wards in the hospitals, number of physician specialities, leadership or the division of tasks. 
The regression on time allocation among different ward show a significant differences in 
especially three wards. The results in this regression, are the much of the same findings 
explored in Midttun`s (2007) article on time allocation among medical specialists.  
The regression indicates that it is a difference in time allocation among the hospital wards. 
The results show that all the hospital wards (with Radiotherapy as reference) work 
significantly less hours on patient related assignments than the Radiotherapy ward. The 
results in table 7.2 illustrates that the hospital wards that allocates the most time on patient 
related work are the Otorhinolaryngology ward, Anaesthesiology ward and the Radiotherapy 
ward, when looking at the total share of patient related work. The findings in the regression 
in table 7.4 show almost the same results apart from the Otorhinolaryngology ward that is 
replaced by the Orthopaedics ward. Some of these findings are in line with similar studies as 
in Midttun`s (2007) article in time allocation, apart from the Ophthalmology that was 
replaced by Otorhinolaryngology and Orthopaedic ward in my results. Midttun (2007) use 
the variable “medical speciality” instead of hospital ward, but I assume that this will not 
constitute much difference in the comparison. Midttun also finds that the Ophthalmologists, 
Anaesthesiologists and Radiologists spend less time on administrative work and 
research/education and these findings are the same in my results. It seems that with an 
increase in patient related work there is a decrease in time spent on administrative work, and 
the other way. An example of this can be seen in time allocation at the Neurological ward, 
the Medical ward and the category “other hospital wards”. These wards allocate the less time 
on patient related work, but the most hours in administrative work. This exemplify that it 
seems to be some stable differences in hospital wards (medical specialities) on time 
allocation between different assignments.  
8.2 Weaknesses 
The hospital physicians were given self reported answers in the surveys. The fact that the 
surveys are based on self reported answers leads to an asymmetric information problem. 
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This can be a weakness since the physicians may have a self interest in presenting the reality 
some what different than it is. Hence the self reported information may not be entirely 
reliable. According to similar studies, it might be under- and over reporting in the answers, 
so the data material might not be that flawed (Midttun, 2005)  
Other factors that might influence the answers are the respondents in the sample. According 
to the Hawthorne effect, workers that participate in working surveys are more productive 
than they who do not participate (Røhme & Kjekshus, 2001). 
The survey from 2006 asked the physicians to evaluate the hospital reform while the survey 
from 2001 asked to evaluate the effect of the activity based financing. Due to self interests in 
physicians, this might have had an affect on the answers.  
The data used in this thesis were basically categorical data. This is a disadvantage because 
we can not see the whole scale of numbers. The use of more numerical data might have been 
more useful in this thesis, especially when it comes to age and gross wages. 
8.3 Strengths 
The sample size used in this thesis is representative and the respondents were almost equally 
distributed in both years. The spread in the dataset is also fairly good. There are some 
unequal distributions in the independent variables, as in gender and age, but these 
differences are to be expected. 
The respondent rate was above 50 % in both surveys. This is considered as a high number. 
8.3.1 Omitted variables/changes 
There were some challenges with the dataset at times due to several missing data. There has 
also been discovered some registration faults in some of the questions on the way. It was 
several extreme outliers that were excluded. It has also been several faults in summarizing 
the total working hours per week. The missing data in the category of total hours of work, I 
had to summarize all the variables on time allocation. The physicians opposed to write 
number of hours worked in every assignment in the survey even though the number was 
zero. This was not done several places, so I changed every assignment that was missing into 
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zero, if rest of the hours allocated in the different assignment corresponded with total 
working hours. 
I have also chosen to omit all the physicians in the data that had not answered on time 
allocation at all, since total working hours and patient related assignments was my main 
variable. The omitted physicians also had after all, usually limited answers in almost all the 
questions. 
In the variable of present position, the registration of the data in 2006 was somewhat 
different than in 2001. The categorical data was coded into 5 categories in both years, but in 
2006 the data was registered into 1 - 6. I assumed that since the first category (Unit Chief 
physician/Clinic Chief) was the only category that had two positions together, it has been 
coded as 1 and 2 in the dataset. I recoded like this: 1=1, 2=1, 3=2, 4=3, 5=4, 6=5. We can 
see from the descriptive statistics in table 5.2, that the distribution between the positions in 
2001 and 2006 are skewed. This can be due to coincidences or errors.    
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9. Conclusion 
There have been modest changes in working time, with approximately 1 hour decrease in 
total working hours in 2006, and 1 approximately 1 hour more on patient related work in the 
same year. It can not be concluded that the hospital reform have had any effect on working 
hours and time allocation, but there are indications in the study that trends and tendencies 
towards more family life and leisure are influencing the labour supply among physicians. 
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11. APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: Descriptive statistics  
  2001 2006 
Year- 0:2006; 1:2001   
Share of patient related work 23.20 (9.04) 23.93 (10.67) 
Share of administrative work 17.33 (9.01) 16.51 (9.69) 
Share of research and education work 3.41 (4.48) 3.57 (6.07) 
Share of  ”other” work 1.55 (3.45) 1.09 (2.89) 
Total working hours 45.00 (6.67) 44.75 (9.04) 
Total working hours outside the hospital 1.79 (4.26) 1.39 (5.50) 
Gross wage in the main job 4.43 (1.10) 5.15 (1.27) 
Gross wage in the physician work beside the main job 1.50 (0.94) 1.49 (1.34) 
Gender- 1:male; 0:female 1.27 (0.45) 1.33 (0.47) 
Age 3.08 (1.04) 3.07 (1.11) 
20-29- 0: other; 1: 20-29  0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.20) 
30-39- 0: other; 1: 30-39 0.30 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 
40-49- 0: other; 1: 40-49 0.31 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 
50-59- 0: other; 1: 50-59 0.25 (0.43) 0.22 (0.41) 
60-60- 0: other; 1: 60-69 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.32) 
70 or more- 0: other; 1: 70 or more 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.04) 
Speciality approval- 0: no; 1: yes 0.69 (0.46) 0.66 (0.47) 
Marital status 2.01 (0.42) 1.99 (0.42) 
Umarried- 0: other; 1: Unmarried 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.20) 
Married/Cohabitant- 0: Other; 1: Married/Cohabitant 0.30 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47) 
Divorced/Separated- 0: other; 1: Divorced/Separated 0.31 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 
Widow(er)- 0: other; 1: Widow(er) 0.25 (0.43) 0.22 (0.41) 
Share of children 1.36 (1.27) 1.33 (1.29) 
Present position 2.74 (1.10) 2.47 (1.29) 
Unit Chief Physician /Clinic chief- 0: other; 1: Unit Chief Physician /Clinic chief 0.19 (0.39) 0.22 (0.42) 
Section Chief Physician- 0: other; 1: Section Chief Physician 0.18 (0.38) 0.43 (0.50) 
Chief Physician- 0: other; 1: Chief Physician 0.34 (0.48) 0.13 (0.34) 
Consultant Physician- 0: other; 1: Consultant Physician 0.27 (0.44) 0.08 (0.27) 
Other position- 0: other; 1: Other speciality 0.02 (0.12) 0.13 (0.34) 
Present ward 7.12 (2.94) 7.20 (2.92) 
Ophthalmology- 0: other; 1: Ophthalmology 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 
Otorhinolaryngology - 0: other; 1: Otorhinolaryngology 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.16) 
Surgical ward- 0: other; 1: Surgical ward 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.34) 
Orthopaedic ward- 0: other; 1: Orthopaedic ward 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.23) 
Neurological ward- 0: other; 1: Neurological ward 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 
Laboratory- 0: other; 1: Laboratory 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.24) 
Anaesthesiology- 0:other; 1: Anaesthesiology 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30) 
Medical ward- 0:other; 1: Medical ward 0.23 (0.42) 0.21 (0.41) 
Radiotherapy department- 0:other; 1: Radiotherapy department 0.06 (0.25) 0.08 (0.26) 
Obstetrics/gynaecology- 0:other; 1: Obstetrics/gynaecology 0.07 (0.25) 0.07 (0.26) 
Other hospital ward- 0: other; 1: Other hospital ward 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 
Region 2.29 (1.38) 2.40 (1.31) 
1. South- 0: other; 1: south  0.44 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47) 
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2. East- 0: other; 1: East 0.15 (0.36) 0.26 (0.44) 
3. West- 0:other; 1:West 0.18 (0.38) 0.20 (0.40) 
4. Middle- 0: other; 1: Middle 0.15 (0.35) 0.12 (0.32) 
5. North- 0: other; 1:North 0.09 (0.28) 0.10 (0.30) 
Mean values (standard deviation)   
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APPENDIX 2: Time allocation in hospital wards 
 
Patient related work 2001  2006  Totalt  N 
Ophthalmology 25,14 (9,88)) 25,83 (8,65) 25,52 (9,13) 47 
Otorhinolaryngology 22,10 (5,46) 26,64 (13,06) 24,51 (10,41) 62 
Surgical ward 23,80 (8,30) 24,58 (10,24) 24,28 (9,54) 250 
Orthopaedics 23,72 (7,62) 26,86 (9,16) 25,39 (8,59) 124 
Neurological ward 21,70 (8,15) 18,73 (9,39) 19,89 (9,01) 103 
Laboratory 22,85 (11,42) 19,68 (12,28) 20,80 (12,02) 110 
Anaesthesiology 27,19 (10,28) 29,02 (11,30) 28,29 (10,92) 203 
Medical ward 21,05 (8,00) 21,26 (8,89) 21,17 (8,52) 447 
Radiotherapy department 30,42 (11,28) 33,32 (9,66) 32,30 (10,31) 139 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 21,96 (7,49) 25,97 (9,73) 24,43 (9,12) 140 
Other ward 20,89 (8,34) 20,77 (9,07) 20,82 (8,77) 371 
Total (N) 802 1194    1996 
Adm.work 2001 2006 Total N 
Ophthalmology 11,59 (5,30) 13,98 (6,78) 12,96 (6,24) 40 
Otorhinolaryngology 15,54 (8,65) 12,97 (6,44) 14,34 (7,73) 43 
Surgical ward 20,56 (15,14) 16,71 (7,95) 18,07 (11,15) 201 
Orthopaedics 18,02 (7,85) 18,03 (8,14) 18,03 (7,96) 93 
Neurological ward 18,96 (6,93) 19,56 (11,16) 19,34 (9,74) 82 
Laboratory 15,98 (9,83) 13,76 (8,27) 14,59 (8,89) 86 
Anaesthesiology 13,68 (8,43) 13,03 (10,19) 13,32 (9,41) 144 
Medical ward 19,47 (6,39) 19,00 (8,42) 19,20 (7,63) 357 
Radiotherapy department 9,30 (8,46) 7,03 (6,74) 7,84 (7,44) 89 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 18,44 (8,73) 15,29 (10,78) 16,57 (10,07) 118 
Other ward 18,89 (8,00) 18,73 (8,76) 18,79 (8,44) 282 
Total (N) 631 904   1535 
Research/Education 2001 2006 Total N 
Ophthalmology 1,89 (1,44) 2,80 (4,07) 2,39 (3,16) 42 
Otorhinolaryngology 2,92 (4,33) 2,82 (5,24) 2,86 (4,81) 54 
Surgical ward 3,33 (3,65) 3,72 (5,66) 3,58 (5,01) 227 
Orthopaedics 3,77 (4,82) 3,54 (5,18) 3,65 (4,99) 111 
Neurological ward 2,51 (2,38) 4,88 (9,26) 3,87 (7,25) 87 
Laboratory 6,12 (7,34) 5,57 (6,45) 5,76 (6,75) 93 
Anaesthesiology 3,13 (4,55) 2,92 (5,63) 3,00 (5,21) 167 
Medical ward 3,48 (4,20) 3,76 (6,5) 3,64 (5,63) 395 
Radiotherapy department 3,04 (3,63) 1,57 (1,84) 2,14 (2,76) 119 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 3,24 (4,26) 3,26 (6,98) 3,25 (6,01) 124 
Other ward 3,52 (4,06) 3,76 (5,86) 3,66 (5,18) 323 
Total (N) 715 1027   1742 
Other activities 2001 2006 Total N 
Ophthalmology 1,00 (1,41) 1,42 (2,63) 1,23 (2,16) 47 
Otorhinolaryngology 1,93 (2,97) 1,00 (2,75) 1,44 (2,87) 62 
Surgical ward 1,35 (3,09) 1,02 (2,03) 1,15 (2,48) 250 
Orthopaedics 1,59 (2,52) 0,94 (1,69) 1,25 (2,14) 124 
Neurological ward 1,35 (2,90) 0,82 (1,77) 1,02 (2,28) 103 
Laboratory 2,82 (4,86) 3,26 (6,24) 3,10 (5,77) 110 
Anaesthesiology 1,34 (2,92) 1,24 (2,87) 1,28 (2,88) 203 
Medical ward 1,3 (4,21) 1,04 (3,28) 1,15 (3,7) 447 
Radiotherapy department 1,12 (2,51) 0,41 (0,81) 0,66 (1,65) 139 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 2,54 (3,44)) 0,65 (1,39) 1,38 (2,56) 140 
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Other ward 1,85 (3,95) 0,88 (1,72) 1,28 (3,13) 371 
Total (N) 415 685   1996 
Mean estimates with standard error in parentheses.  
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APPENDIX 3: Distribution of hospitals 
 
The number of hospitals responding 2001 2006 Total Total excluded 
Sunnaas Sykehus HF 0 8 9 1 
St Olavs Hospital 84 69 153 5 
Helse Blefjell HF 3 14 17 1 
Sykehuset Buskerud HF 30 36 66 4 
Akershus Unversitetssykehus 47 54 101 6 
Aker Universitetssykehus HF 39 42 81 6 
Asker og Bærum sykehus HF 21 31 52 3 
Sykehuset Innlandet HF 66 78 144 8 
Sykehuset Østfold 37 45 82 9 
Ullevål Universitetssykehus HF 112 140 252 9 
Helse Stavanger HF 55 66 121 8 
Helse Fonna HF 22 31 53 4 
Helse Bergen HF 82 121 203 18 
Helse Førde HF 18 21 39 1 
Helse Sunnmøre HF 4 38 42 2 
Helse Nordmøre og Romsdal HF 53 13 66 1 
Helse Nord Trøndelag HF 12 24 36 3 
Helse Finnmark HF 6 8 14 1 
Universitetssykehuset i Norde Norge HF 39 59 98 2 
Hålogalandsykehus HF 12 11 23 2 
Nordlandssykehuset HF 23 35 58 5 
Helgelandssykehuset HF 11 6 17 1 
Radium-/Rikshospitalet HF 127 129 256 13 
Sørlandet sykehus HF 54 63 117 8 
Sykehuset i Vestfold HF 34 43 77 2 
Sykehuset i Telemark HF 28 29 57 4 
Ringerike sykehus HF 7 10 17 0 
Missing 30 4 34  
Total 1056 1224 2285 127 
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APPENDIX 4: QUESTIONNAIRES 
1) How many hours do you allocate in the following activities in the hospital in an 
average working week? Use the last line to sum up the total working time per 
average week. If you have not allocated any time on the definite activities, write 0. 
2) How many hours do you work in paid work employment outside the hospital where 
you have your main attachment, in an average working week? 
3) What was your gross wage from work in the hospital where you have your main 
attachment in year 2000? 
4) What was your gross wage (deduct possible running expences), from physician work 
outside the hospital in year 2000? 
5) Gender? 
6) Age? 
7) Specialist approval? 
8) Marital status? 
9) How many children do you have present care for? 
10) What is your present position? 
11) In what kind of hospital ward are you mainly working at? 
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APPENDIX 5: CATEGORIES IN THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
Question 1 
Direct patient related work (with patients or work with tests, pictures etc, on patients) 
Meetings (meeting in the morning and other professional meetings) 
Leadership- and staff assignments  
Administrative work (Journals, epicrices, coding, referral, filing, medical certificates etc) 
Telephone and electronic communication beyond patient related work 
Research 
Education/teaching 
Other 
Total hours worked in an average working week 
 
Question 2 
The total hours worked outside the hospital in an average working week 
 
Question 3 
Less than 150 000 NOK 
150 000-299 000 NOK 
300 000- 449 000 NOK 
450 000-599 000 NOK 
600 000-749 000 NOK 
750 000- 899 000 NOK 
900 000-1 100 000 NOK 
1 100 000 or more 
 
Question 4 
Less than 150 000 NOK 
150 000-299 000 NOK 
300 000- 449 000 NOK 
450 000-599 000 NOK 
600 000-749 000 NOK 
750 000- 899 000 NOK 
900 000-1 100 000 NOK 
1 100 000 or more 
 
Question 5 
Man or woman 
 
Question 6 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
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50-59 
60-69 
70 or more 
 
Question 7 
Yes or no 
 
Question 8 
Unmarried 
Married/Cohabitant 
Divorced/Separated 
Widow(er) 
 
Question 10 
Unit Chief Physician /Clinic chief 
Section Chief Physician 
Chief Physician 
Consultant Physician 
Other 
 
Question 11 
Ophthalmology 
Otorhinolaryngology  
Surgical ward 
Orthopaedics 
Neurological ward 
Laboratory 
Anaesthesiology 
Medical ward 
Radiotherapy department 
Obstetrics/gynaecology 
Other speciality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
